

It is usually understood that the reason Pirithous is designated *deorum spreter* and (ordinarily) enchained as punishment in the underworld is because of the ill-conceived abduction of Proserpina, and this assumption is supported, in the Latin poets, by Horace's designation of the culprit as *amator*.<sup>20</sup> But Juno's words and Servius' explanation suggest another reason as well for Pirithous' doom, a reason particularly à propos for explicating the suitability of the untouchable wedding banquet as torment for the Lapiths.

One Virgilian novelty elucidates a tight complex of others.<sup>21</sup> If Servius is correct that the Lapiths were destroyed because of Mars' anger at their failure to invite him to the wedding of Hippodamia and Pirithous, then, in this respect, too, the *contrapasso* is brilliantly arranged by Virgil. War's god, prone to rage and madness, is represented by a fury who, in warding the Lapiths away from the marriage board, serves as eternal reminder of how an act of impiety, the scorning of a major divinity by the protagonists of a nuptial rite, brings disorder instead of rationality.<sup>22</sup> Mars' vengeance is fittingly wrought through the sempiternal temptations of the same enchanting ceremony, ever watched but never shared.\*

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<sup>20</sup> The reason usually given for Ovid's designation is the attempted rape of Proserpina. See A. S. Hollis (Ovid, *Metamorphoses*: Book VIII [Oxford, 1970]) and F. Bömer (P. Ovidius Naso, *Metamorphosen*: Buch VIII–IX [Heidelberg, 1977], *ad loc.*

<sup>21</sup> Another famous Virgilian invention, devoted to the Lapiths and still deserving of full analysis, is the double transfiguration of the Lapith Caenis whose metamorphosis into a man, Caeneus, and death by crushing are told by Ovid in the lines which follow his treatment of the battle of Lapiths and Centaurs (*M.* 12.459–535). Only Virgil has a second metamorphosis, with Caeneus in the underworld become female again (*Aen.* 6.448–9).

<sup>22</sup> It is worthy of note that Virgil has the same attribute of the Fury here, *Furiarum maxima*, allotted in 3.252 by Celaeno to herself (*vobis Furiarum ego maxima pando*). The situations are parallel enough to warrant fuller discussion because in book 3 the Fury also curses someone, this time Aeneas and his followers, with the impossibility of eating. The reason for the curse is the impious grasping of another's property as booty, in this case cattle who were actually eaten only in part (*semesam praedam*, 244). The curse remains but a modified, momentary version of the eternal torture of book 6, namely that in the future their hunger will force the Trojans to devour their own tables (*ambesas mensas*, 257). The curse is fulfilled at 7.107–34.

\* I would like to thank the Editors and Prof. W. N. Turpin for helpful suggestions.

#### A NOTE ON HORACE, *EPISTLES* 1.2.26 AND 2.2.75

Sirenum voces et Circae pocula nosti;  
quae si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset,  
sub domina meretrice fuisset turpis et excors,  
vixisset canis immundus vel amica luto sus.

(*Ep.* 1.2.23–6)

Scholars have long seen that Horace's treatment of Homer in this Epistle demands to be read in the tradition of moral allegory in which Ulysses becomes the type of the 'man of virtue' ('*rursus quid virtus et quid sapientia possit / utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulixen*', 17–18): on such a reading, Circe becomes an allegory of foolish passion 'to which Ulysses' companions give in through their *stultitia*, and because of which they lose their reason and become no better than animals. Antisthenes, from whose writings such an allegorising approach probably developed, was regarded as an

<sup>1</sup> Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.7; Schol. *Od.* 10.239.

early Cynic,<sup>2</sup> and the idea became the special province of Cynic-Stoic philosophy;<sup>3</sup> scholars have therefore felt justified in seeing this epistle as a criticism of Epicureanism, represented by the *sponsi Penelopae, nebulones, Alcinoique ... iuventus*,<sup>4</sup> from the point of view of a Cynic or a syncretistic Stoic.<sup>5</sup>

Line 26 should give us pause, however: Homer's Circe attempts to change Ulysses into a swine,<sup>6</sup> whereas Horace's *Circae pocula* would have turned him into a *canis immundus vel amica luto sus*. Besides swine, Homer mentions wolves and lions on Circe's island<sup>7</sup> but no dogs, so what is the point of the change? If we read the line allegorically in the light of Horace's philosophical preoccupations the solution seems obvious: the *canis immundus* represents the Cynic philosopher,<sup>8</sup> the *amica luto sus* the Epicurean. The poet himself provides support for such an interpretation by linking the imagery of this Epistle with that of *Ep.* 1.4 through the phrases 'in cute curanda' (1.2.29) and 'bene curata cute' (1.4.15):<sup>9</sup> cuticle-care is a fault of the over-luxurious Phaeacians in the former Epistle, and an attribute of Horace as an Epicurean in the latter. But how does Horace describe himself in the fourth Epistle? As *Epicuri de grege porcum* (1.4.16): the pig image is expressly Epicurean, and the verbal links entitle us to read it back into *Ep.* 1.2. To attach a similar philosophical value to 'canis immundus' is an easy step:<sup>10</sup> the Cynics acquired their name from their dog-like behaviour,<sup>11</sup> and the epithet 'immundus' recalls the ἀναίδεια which they were supposed to practise.<sup>12</sup>

Reading the line in this way forces us to re-interpret the role of the *utile exemplar*. The man of virtue, the wise man, is the one who does not allow himself to be seduced by a *domina meretrix*, who therefore does not commit himself to either of the two philosophies, and who does not abandon the use of his reason to live *turpis et excors*. He has already dismissed the claims of Chrysippus (a Stoic) and Crantor (an Academic) in line 4, and the interpretation of line 26 which is here proposed would, besides explaining his variation on Homer, allow Horace to hold to his claim to be *nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri* (*Ep.* 1.1.14).

This might in turn lead us to reconsider what Horace says at *Ep.* 2.2.75 ('hac rabiosa fugit canis, hac lutulenta ruit sus'): even if we allow that the line's primary meaning is the obvious one, that Horace cannot compose verses in Rome because, in part, of the noise and distraction of animals in the streets, we should surely also admit the suggestion, in the light of *Ep.* 1.2.26, that he cannot compose in peace because

<sup>2</sup> Called κύων by some (Diog. Laert. 6.13); and in general see N. J. Richardson, *PCPS* 201 (1975), 65–81, esp. 77ff.

<sup>3</sup> Ulysses 'sapientissimus', Cic. *Tusc.* 2.40; declared a wise man of the Stoics, Seneca *de Constantia Sapientis* 2.2; embodiment of all virtue, Heraclitus 70.1.

<sup>4</sup> See E. Kaiser, *Mus. Helv.* 21 (1964), 109ff., 197ff. for further examples of such topoi.

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. J. Moles, *Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar* 5 (1985), pp. 33f.; also, with lines 26–29 cf. Diogenes' words in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 8.25.

<sup>6</sup> *Od.* 10.320.

<sup>7</sup> *Od.* 10.212, 218 (λύκοι... ἡδὲ λέοντες); they behave like dogs, however.

<sup>8</sup> Moles (art. cit. 53, n. 14) was right to say that the phrase 'does not rule out a cynic interpretation', but he did not make the wider connexion.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Moles, art. cit. 36ff.

<sup>10</sup> Horace had already made the antithesis between 'canis' and 'mundus' as terms attached to people at *Sat.* 2.2.55ff. It is the *sapiens* who will be *mundus*.

<sup>11</sup> Diogenes as a dog: see e.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 3.10.7; Dio Chrys. 8.11, 9.3, 7; Diog. Laert. 6.33, 40, 55, 60, 61, 78; Stob. *Flor.* 3.13.44.

<sup>12</sup> ἀναίδεια: cf. Diog. Laert. 6.69: εἰώθει δὲ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, καὶ τὰ Δήμητρος καὶ τὰ Ἀφροδίτης; Lactant. *Inst.* 3.15 fin.: Nam quid ego de Cynicis loquar, quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit? Quid mirum si a canibus, quorum vitam imitantur, etiam vocabulum nomenque traxerunt.

these wretched philosophers are running all over the city. It would be odd if we failed to make such a connexion between the two places in Horace's *Epistles*<sup>13</sup> where the poet presents us with unhealthy dogs and muddy pigs, when the connexion can so easily be made.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> 'Canis' and 'sus' are paired again at *Epod.* 12.6, but it is difficult to see a philosophical connexion there.

<sup>14</sup> I am grateful to Dr N. J. Richardson and Dr L. G. H. Hall for their encouragement and comments.

### CERINTHUS' *PIA CURA* ([TIBULLUS] 3.17.1–2)

In a recent issue of *CQ*, N. J. Lowe refers to the 'slyly Catullan appeal to the language of *pietas*' in [Tib.] 3.7 (4.11) 1–2 ('Estne tibi, Cerinthe, tuae pia cura puellae / quod mea nunc vexat corpora fessa calor'?).<sup>1</sup> In this he follows Matthew Santirocco, who comments on these lines: 'significantly, the expression for love here is not just *cura* as before [*sc.* in 3.16 [4.10] 3], but *pia cura*. We recall the *pietas* Catullus proclaimed in his affair with Lesbia (cf. 76.2,5) and perhaps also *pious Aeneas* and all that *pietas* meant to the Augustan age, and then we realise that Sulpicia is now concerned not so much with the mere fact of Cerinthus' affection as with its quality.'<sup>2</sup>

I think this is misguided, that *pia cura* has nothing to do with the 'quality' of 'Cerinthus' affection', and that there is no 'slyly Catullan appeal to the language of *pietas*'. What is important in Sulpicia, as in Catullus, is the language of *amicitia*. *Pius* (and *pietas*) carries with it the notion of the fulfilment of obligations, whether to the gods or, as often, to one's family or friends. Thus it can be employed in the context of *amicitia*, as it is by Catullus at the opening of 73 (a poem on the betrayal of friendship):

desine de quoquam quicquam bene velle mereri  
aut aliquem fieri posse putare *pium*

on which Kroll aptly remarks: 'die pietas zeigt sich auch darin, dass man die beneficia des Freundes erwidert.' Indeed, *pious* and *pietas* appear frequently in the context of the obligations of friendship: cf. Cic. *Ad. Fam.* 1.9, *Att.* 9.11a3, *Fam.* 1.1.1, 1.8.2, *Planc.* 96, Curtius 9.6.16, Horace, *Epist.* 1.14.6 (with K-H's note), Ovid, *Trist.* 1.5.38, 5.3.47 etc.

Catullus' importance in this regard is that he seems to have been the first to apply the language of *amicitia* and the notion of reciprocal *beneficia*, which of course lies at the heart of Greco-Roman ideas on friendship, to a (heterosexual) love-affair. Nowhere is this better to be seen than in 76, a poem replete with the language of *amicitia* and which begins with the linking of *benefacta* (*beneficia*) and *pietas*:

siqua recordanti benefacta priora voluptas  
est homini, cum se cogitat esse *pium*...<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Sulpicia's Syntax', *CQ* N.S. 38 (1988), 193–205, p. 200.

<sup>2</sup> 'Sulpicia Reconsidered', *CJ* 74 (1979), 229–39, p. 233.

<sup>3</sup> On the 'recalling of benefits' as a topos of moral philosophy, see J. G. F. Powell, 'Two Notes on Catullus', *CQ* N.S. 40 (1990), 199–206. Powell points to its occurrences in Cicero, but rightly sees that it is a case of *Vulgarethik* rather than literary influence. The same, of course, is true of *beneficia vis-à-vis* friendship and *pietas*. I am grateful to Dr Powell for sending me an advance copy of his article.